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Goldstein and Lardy (2005) have also argued that the system is unsustainable. However, 
their focus is the sustainability of financing to cover the U.S. trade deficit, whereas the 
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I Introduction
In a series of papers Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003, 2004a, 2004b) – 
henceforth DFG – have suggested that today’s international financial system has 
structural similarities with the Bretton Woods arrangement that held sway between 1946 
and 1971. Export-led growth by developing countries figures heavily in their analysis, 
and DFG have done a major service by reminding the economics profession of export-led 
growth and the possibility that it can have significant international macroeconomic 
effects.1 
This paper agrees with DFG’s emphasis on export-led growth, but challenges 
their comparison of today’s system with the Bretton Woods system. It also differs 
regarding their conclusion that today’s system is sustainable for the medium term, and 
instead argues that the system is prone to a crash. Other authors (Eichengreen, 2004; 
Goldstein and Lardy, 2005) have also argued that the system will crash, but their 
arguments are different. In particular, they focus on the sustainability of financing for the 
U.S. trade deficit, whereas the current paper focuses on the demand-side inadequacies of 
the system. Finally, the paper concludes with suggestions for a global system of managed 
exchange rates that should replace the current system – hopefully, before it crashes.
II The Revised Bretton Woods Hypothesis
The DFG hypothesis is that today’s international financial system has structural 
resemblances with the earlier Bretton Woods system. That earlier system was one of 
fixed exchange rates, and according to their analysis was a center – periphery system in 
which the post-World War II U.S. was the center, while war-ravaged Europe was the 
1 Blecker (2000) and Palley (2003) have earlier explored the global macroeconomic inconsistencies of 
export-led growth.
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developing periphery. Within this framework, the U.S. proceeded to run progressively 
growing trade deficits with Europe that eventually caused the system’s demise, but that 
demise was slow in coming.
DFG argue that today’s global financial system has strong resemblances with this 
earlier system, with the U.S. still the center, but East Asia (especially China) now playing 
the role of the periphery. China has an explicitly fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar, 
while other East Asian economies actively manage their exchange rates to prevent them 
appreciating against the dollar. Additionally, the East Asia region is running huge trade 
surpluses with the United States.
The economic logic behind the new system is that East Asian economies are 
pursuing export-led growth, in which exports are the engine of growth. Lacking 
sufficiently robust domestic demand, they need exports to keep their factories operating. 
Export success then serves to attract large-scale foreign direct investment that creates 
jobs, builds manufacturing capacity, and transfers technology. Moreover, foreign 
investors finance this capital accumulation by providing the foreign exchange to purchase 
the capital goods. They also organize its transfer, installation, and operation. In this 
fashion, countries acquire jobs and a modern internationally competitive manufacturing 
sector.2 
However, the price the periphery must pay is exports to the center. This explains 
why savings flow north from poor to rich, rather than from rich to poor as predicted by 
2 DFG emphasize the connection between exports, FDI, and growth. Goldstein and Lardy (2005) have 
rightly criticized them for overemphasizing the contribution of FDI to China’s growth. That said, FDI is a 
critical component of China’s capital and technology accumulation strategy. More importantly, the link that 
should be emphasized is between exports and industrial investment in general, with exports spurring both 
foreign direct investment and domestic manufacturing investment. Exports provide the classic “vent for 
surplus” in China’s economy. China’s entrepreneurial tradition makes it highly efficient at organizing 
capital accumulation. However, China has not yet put in place a domestic consumption market that can 
absorb the production China is capable of organizing. This point is emphasized in Palley (2006a).
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conventional inter-temporal consumption smoothing models of the international 
economy. Additionally, since international competitiveness is key to export-led growth, 
countries actively pursue policies aimed at maintaining under-valued exchange rates. 
This explains China’s refusal to revalue its exchange rate despite its massive and growing 
trade surplus, and it also explains the pattern of accumulation of dollar denominated 
official reserves throughout East Asia.  
III The misplaced analogy with Bretton Woods
DFG’s analogy of the present system with Bretton Woods rests on a number of 
similar macroeconomic patterns, including quasi-fixed exchange rates and the fact of 
persistent and growing U.S. trade deficits financed by the periphery. This analogy is 
wrong and ignores the fundamentally different microeconomic regimes governing the 
two periods.
There are three significant differences between today’s system and the earlier 
system. First, today’s trade deficits are the result of on export-led growth predicated upon 
under-valued exchange rates, yet the purpose of Bretton Woods was to prevent “beggar-
thy-neighbor” trade based on competitive devaluation such as had afflicted the 
international economy in the Great Depression era. Though Germany’s exchange rate 
alignment in the old Bretton Woods system came to be significantly under-valued, that 
was not the case for the United Kingdom. Moreover, the Bretton Woods system had 
formal provisions whereby countries with structural trade deficits could devalue. 
Second, the current period has multi-national corporations shifting to China to 
establish state of the art export platforms whose production is intended for export back to 
the center (the U.S.). This contrasts with the 1950s and 1960s when American multi-
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nationals established production facilities in Europe for purposes of supplying the 
European market. Companies such as Ford, General Motors and IBM produced in Europe 
for Europe, not for export back to the United States. Likewise, European capital 
accumulation was primarily intended for European markets.
Third, the growing U.S. trade deficits of the 1960s were driven by full 
employment in the U.S. with growing wages, a growing manufacturing sector, and 
increasing manufacturing employment. This contrasts with current trade deficits that are 
driven by debt-financed consumption spending supported by a house price bubble, and 
these deficits are also displacing U.S. manufacturing. Whereas the U.S. trade deficits of 
the 1960s were consistent with a robust and stable aggregate demand generation process, 
the current system is hollowing out the income and aggregate demand generation process 
and eroding manufacturing capacity.
III Why the new regime will fail
DFG maintain that the new system is sustainable and can last for another decade. 
In terms of their Bretton Woods analogy, the situation is closer to 1958 than 1968 (the 
Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971). The reason for this stability is that the new 
arrangement suits both U.S. and East Asian interests - particularly those of China. The 
steady flow of imports that constitute the U.S. trade deficit, supply a stream of cheap 
consumption goods that lowers consumer prices, keeping down inflation. This enables 
the Fed to hold the line on interest rates despite reduced unemployment rates. 
Additionally, East Asian countries contribute to the favorable interest rate environment 
by re-cycling their trade surpluses into U.S. Treasury bonds as part of their strategy of 
keeping their currencies undervalued vis-à-vis the dollar.
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East Asia benefits from exporting to the U.S., which keeps its factories fully 
employed. Export success in turn spurs domestic and foreign direct investment in 
manufacturing, fuelling growth and development. For China, this is especially important 
as it needs to create jobs rapidly to absorb rural migration to the cities. If jobs are not 
forthcoming, this could trigger social and political unrest that would pose a threat to 
Communist Party rule. These benefits mean that East Asian governments are willing to 
continue accumulating U.S. financial assets, ensuring a sustainable stream of financing 
for the U.S. trade deficit at current interest rates and exchange rates. For East Asian 
countries, portfolio risk and return are not the driving force of their financial investment 
decisions, and therefore do not enter their calculus. Economic growth is.
Additionally, this configuration of national economic interests is under-written 
politically by U.S. multinationals. Given their East Asian investments and the 
profitability of sub-contracted production, these corporations are willing to do the 
political lobbying in Washington that heads-off “protectionist” pressures generated by the 
trade deficit and U.S. de-industrialization. Finally, the fact that the dollar is no longer 
officially convertible into gold adds extra stability to the system, and closes the weakness 
that brought down the original Bretton Woods system.3
Existing arguments why the system is unstable 
DFG’s claim regarding the stability of the new system has been challenged by 
several authors. Eichengreen (2004) argues that the system will collapse because of 
inconsistencies between the system and individual country financial interests. While it is 
true the system delivers export-led growth for East Asian economies, countries are 
3 President Nixon suspended the right of countries to convert official dollar reserves into gold on August 
15, 1971 in the face of large gold conversions, especially by France. 
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obliged to accumulate massive dollar reserves. These accumulations are unwise from a 
portfolio standpoint, lacking diversification and exposing countries to massive capital 
losses (equal to several percentage points of GDP) should the dollar ever fall in value. As 
a result, individual countries have an incentive to diversify their reserve holdings even 
though they benefit from the system as a whole. In effect, there is a classic cartel problem 
with individual members having an incentive to cheat on the system.
There are two serious objections to Eichengreen’s analysis. The first objection 
concerns where East Asian countries place their reserves. Here, the principal option is the 
euro. There may also be some purchasing of other East Asian country currencies, 
especially the yen. Additionally, there may be some buying of gold and commodities, and 
countries may also buy real assets such as equities. However, these diversification 
activities do not necessarily fatally wound the system.
Selling dollars and buying euros will appreciate the euro vis-à-vis the dollar, 
undermining European international competitiveness and exporting deflation and 
unemployment to Europe. However, the dollar will retain roughly the same parity against 
East Asian currencies. As their principal export market, all East Asian economies have an 
incentive not to let their currency appreciate too much against the dollar, and they all 
have an incentive not to appreciate too much against rival East Asian economies. These 
incentives provide a centripetal force that stabilizes the system.
Similarly, purchases of commodities and equities may cause commodity and asset 
price inflation, but they too leave the dollar exchange rate essentially unchanged. And to 
the extent that East Asian countries do sell Treasury bonds, this will drive up U.S. interest 
rates, thereby providing an incentive to remain invested in dollars.
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A second objection to Eichengreen’s claim concerns its assumption that East 
Asian economies ultimately face capital losses on their dollar reserve holdings. This 
assumption tacitly assumes the conclusion that the system is unstable. In fact, it is quite 
possible that China could end up reaping large capital gains on its holdings. The logic is 
as follows. China is resisting exchange rate appreciation to preserve its export-led growth 
model. Yet, at the same time it is gradually working toward international opening of its 
capital markets. Such opening could eventually trigger a depreciation of renminbi if 
Chinese wealth holders exit the domestic system for purposes of economic and political 
portfolio diversification.4 In this event, China will make large capital gains on its reserve 
holdings, and it will also get a second wind for its export led-growth program.
This scenario should be extremely troubling to U.S. policymakers concerned 
about America’s industrial base, yet the U.S. Treasury Department is actively promoting 
such an outcome by demanding capital market openness. Once China liberalizes its 
capital markets and floats its exchange rate, the U.S. will no longer be able to claim that 
China is manipulating its exchange rate and international legal grounds for action against 
China will disappear. Yet, capital market opening and renminbi depreciation are the 
diametric opposite of what the U.S. needs. The U.S. problem is with the trade balance 
and the exchange rate, and that calls for Chinese revaluation without capital market 
opening. The Treasury’s policy promises to aggravate both the exchange rate and trade 
balance problems. 
The U.S Treasury’s policy stance repeats the mistakes made with Japan in the 
early 1980s. At that time Japan was running a large trade surplus and was relatively 
4 Chinese wealth holders will want to diversify for standard economic reasons. They will also want to 
diversify for political reasons given the questions about rule of law in China and the potential for future 
political instability. 
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financially closed. The U.S. Treasury pushed Japan to open its financial markets, which 
Japan did. As a result, un-diversified Japanese wealth holders exited Japan looking to 
invest overseas, causing the yen to fall and increasing Japan’s trade surplus.
Goldstein and Lardy (2005) provide a second line of criticism of DFG’s stability 
claim. Their analysis is a combination of positive and normative arguments that say not 
only will the system breakdown because of costs to China of maintaining it, but it is also 
in China’s best interests that it breakdown. The principal focus of their analysis is the 
high cost to Chinese authorities of sterilizing monetary inflows into China. To prevent 
exchange rate appreciation China’s central bank sells renminbi, which increases the 
money supply and poses inflationary dangers. To sterilize this money supply increase, the 
bank then sells domestic bonds and soaks up excess liquidity. However, this in turn 
drives up interest rates, and distorts financial signals. To counter this, the central bank has 
turned to administrative controls such as higher reserve requirements on commercial 
bank deposits and higher administered deposit rates to attract and retain bank deposits. 
However, Goldstein and Lardy believe that at the end of the day these measures will 
prove inadequate, and China will suffer from a combination of costly inflation and costly 
financial system distortions that misallocate and waste resources. They believe these 
costs will compel China to abandon its under-valued exchange rate. 
In addition to this argument, Goldstein and Lardy challenge the underlying 
premise of the DFG hypothesis, namely that FDI-driven export-led growth is critical for 
China’s industrialization. Third, they subscribe to the capital loss on reserves argument 
put forward by Eichengreen (2004). Fourth, they argue that there are large terms of trade 
gains to be had by China from revaluation. This will lower the domestic cost of 
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commodity and capital goods imports, and it will not have a large effect on Chinese 
manufactured exports because they consist considerably of processed products based on 
imported inputs.
Goldstein and Lardy’s arguments are subject to important counter-arguments.5 
First, the sterilization cost argument is essentially a monetarist argument, yet the 
empirical link between the money supply and inflation is known to be long and variable. 
China’s administrative controls have worked well so far, and they may continue to work 
with the assistance of minor adjustments. Second, China’s stiff resistance to revaluation 
provides a “revealed preference” statement by China’s economic policy authorities 
showing that the contribution from export-led manufacturing growth is very important. 
Third, as noted above, it cannot simply be assumed that China will end up suffering 
capital losses on its reserve holdings. Fourth, China has an alternative plan for dealing 
with financial sector resource misallocation. That plan is partial privatization of its banks, 
the goal being for western banks to modernize and improve the banking systems credit 
allocation function. This is to be done within the existing export-led growth strategy, 
which China’s authorities view as helping the industrial sector and promoting capital 
accumulation and job creation. Together, these arguments counter Goldstein and Lardy’s 
arguments why the system is unstable.
A new explanation of instability
DFG, Eichengreen (2004), and Goldstein and Lardy (2005) focus on the 
sustainability of the supply of financing for the U.S. trade deficit. DFG believe this 
supply is sustainable because it meets the needs of supplier (surplus) countries. 
Eichengreen and Goldstein and Lardy believe it is not. The current paper argues that the 
5 These arguments are developed in greater detail in Palley (2006a).
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system is indeed unsustainable and will crash, but not for reasons of supply. Rather, it is 
for reasons associated with the sustainability of the demand side of the system. This 
demand side weakness has been overlooked because of failure to understand the 
microeconomic workings of the current regime.
These workings are shown in figure 1. The key insight is that the financing of 
export-led growth and the U.S. trade deficit is a two-stage intermediated transaction. One 
half of the process involves a transaction between governments and financial 
intermediaries (call them banks) in U.S. financial markets. The other half of the process 
involves a transaction between U.S. banks and ultimate U.S. borrowers (call them 
consumers). The international transaction can be loosely identified with the supply of 
credit from East Asian economies to the U.S. economy. The domestic transaction can be 
loosely identified with the provision and demand for credit within the U.S. economy. The 
system can break down in either the international credit market or the domestic credit 
market. Thus far, attention has exclusively focused on the international credit market and 
possible withdrawal of financing by foreign lenders. However, the real non-sustainability 
may lie on the domestic credit market side.6
Export-led growth relies on selling goods in the U.S. market, but to sell there 
must be a buyer. For the last several years the U.S. consumer has been that buyer, and is 
even sometimes characterized as “the buyer of last resort.” This consumer spending has 
been significantly financed by borrowing, which in turn has been supported by a housing 
price bubble. 
6 These arguments are developed in two policy briefs, “Export-led Growth: The Elephant in the Room 
(January 13, 2006b)” and “Two Views About a Possible Hard Landing: Foreign Flight versus Consumer 
Burnout (December 23, 2005)” posted at www.thomaspalley.com.   
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At this stage, there are several factors that could end the consumption boom. One 
possibility is that the Federal Reserve may over-shoot with its interest rate tightening 
campaign, triggering a recession. A second possibility is that local American banks may 
tighten lending standards and reduce lending because they see households as financially 
over-extended and housing collateral as over-valued. A third possibility is that consumers 
may voluntarily reduce spending. One reason is that the housing price bubble may be 
topping out, thereby eliminating future gains to borrow against and even possibly 
imposing losses. A second reason is that U.S. households face adverse wage and income 
pressures generated by international outsourcing. These pressures have been spreading 
from the manufacturing sector to the larger service sector. 
If U.S. consumption spending falls, East Asian exports will fall. When that 
happens, the willingness of East Asian economies to finance the U.S. trade deficit 
becomes redundant. At that stage, international financing is no longer a binding 
constraint. Instead, the constraint will lie in U.S. goods markets and domestic credit 
markets, and East Asian economies can do nothing to force those transactions by 
providing credit to banks. It is the borrower and local bank that must seal that deal. The 
bottom line is that the system is vulnerable to a crash that originates within the U.S., and 
about which East Asian economies can do little. Indeed, the competitive pressures 
unleashed by export-led growth and outsourcing, are part of the constellation of forces 
making for such a crash.
IV What happens if the U.S. economy sinks into recession?
In the event that the U.S. falls into a consumer-led recession, East Asia is likely to 
be significantly impacted. This contrasts with the recession of 2001, which was an 
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investment-led recession that left East Asia relatively unscathed because it largely 
exports consumer goods. A first impact would be felt via reduced exports, which would 
lower employment. A second impact would be felt via reduced foreign direct investment. 
With excess capacity and diminished export prospects, multinationals would have 
reduced incentives to make new investments.
The U.S. is also likely to find it difficult to escape a consumer-led recession. The 
previous recession was escaped by the combination of a budget U-turn from surplus to 
massive deficit, a significant reduction in interest rates that spurred mortgage refinancing 
that re-liquified household balance sheets, and by consumer borrowing collateralized by a 
house price bubble. Today, these options are no longer available, and the only significant 
space for policy stimulus is for the Fed to reverse itself and cut rates. However, such rate 
cuts will likely be much less effective than previously. One reason is the stock of high 
interest mortgages has already been depleted and refinanced. The second reason is that 
lenders will be less inclined to lend given households’ more financially stretched 
positions. A third reason is that house prices have already risen and are more likely to go 
down than up. The net result is that interest rate reductions are likely be akin to “pushing 
on a string.”
That raises the question of what will happen to the dollar? Diminished U.S. 
economic prospects are likely to promote some portfolio shifting toward Europe and 
Japan. However, the reliance of Europe and Japan on exports to the U.S. means they too 
will be adversely impacted by a U.S. recession, which will reduce the incentive to shift 
into euro and yen investments. Side-by-side, the East Asian countries will be even keener 
to retain competitiveness given they will already be suffering diminished exports. That 
1
suggests they will continue to restrict appreciation against the dollar. The net result is that 
the dollar may not fall very much, making it harder for the U.S. to beat the recession. The 
prognosis is therefore one of prolonged slump.
V Still wanted: a new global financial architecture 
Not only do DFG see the system as stable, they also see it as providing significant 
welfare benefits for all parties involved. In a subsequent paper DFG (2004b) have argued 
that the surpluses earned by East Asian economies represent a means of acquiring foreign 
exchange collateral needed to underwrite foreign direct investment in those economies. 
From their point of view the system should be left as is.
One problem with this collateral argument is that it is distinctly odd that Japan is 
still accumulating collateral. More importantly, their argument does not accord with the 
historical record of how the new system came into being. The system is a product of a 
recent evolution, spurred by the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. In response to that 
crisis, East Asian economies decided to build up massive foreign exchange reserves as a 
protection against future financial panics. They have done this by accepting the currency 
devaluations imposed by markets in the panic of 1997, and this has subsequently turned 
out to confer growth and development benefits on them. 
There are several important points that follow from this. First, the accumulation of 
official reserves has not been driven by a desire to accumulate collateral to underwrite 
FDI. It has been driven by a desire to protect against the possibility of future capital 
flight. Second, the system is an accidental product, the result of state policy responses to 
unwelcome market developments. Viewing the system as the product of optimizing 
markets is the disease of modern economists who interpret everything in this light. Third, 
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the system is globally problematic for reasons discussed in Blecker (2000) and Palley 
(2003). In particular, it promotes global deflation through its excessive emphasis on 
exports, which hollows out the income and aggregate demand generation process in the 
U.S. via de-industrialization and out-sourcing.
This points to the continuing need for a new global financial architecture. The 
global economy papered over the problems of the East Asian financial crisis, but this has 
in turn caused new problems. A new financial architecture, addressing both the root cause 
of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis and the problems that have emerged since, is 
therefore still needed.
The core problems of the international financial system concern capital mobility 
and exchange rates. Destabilizing capital mobility was the essential problem behind the 
East Asian financial crisis, and exchange rates are the essential problem behind today’s 
global financial imbalances. The Bretton Woods system was one of fixed exchange rates 
and tight capital controls. In today’s world neither are feasible nor desirable. Instead. A 
contemporary financial architecture should involve managed capital mobility and 
managed exchange rates. Particularly important is the need to recognize that the existing 
system is a problem for both periphery and center. After the East Asian crisis there was a 
tendency to talk as if only the periphery needed change. The reality is both need change.
There have been many proposals for redesigning the global financial architecture. 
Blecker (1999), Griffiths-Jones and Kimmis (1999), and Palley (1999) provide treatments 
that deal with governing and improving the quality of capital flows. Their collective 
proposals include improved prudential regulation, Chilean-style speed bumps that 
implicitly tax short-term inflows, currency transaction taxes, domestically imposed 
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reserve requirements on lenders, and obligations for lenders to hedge foreign currency 
lending on behalf of borrowers. 
The 1997 financial crisis was centered on capital mobility. Today’s problem is 
gross trade imbalances. These imbalances have elevated the significance of exchange rate 
misalignments, pointing to the need for a system of managed exchange rates that 
promotes exchange rate stability. The obvious candidate is some form of crawling band 
target zone system as proposed by Williamson (1985, 1999), Bergsten et al. (1999), 
Grieve-Smith (1999), and Weller and Singleton (2002). 
Such a system involves choice of a number of parameters that would need to be 
negotiated by participants. First, there is choice of the target exchange rate. Second, there 
is the choice of size of the band in which the exchange rate could fluctuate. Third, there is 
a choice whether the band would be hard or soft. A hard band is automatically and 
decisively defended; a soft band is one that allows for marginal temporary deviations 
outside the band, while retaining a commitment to bring the exchange rate back within 
the band when market conditions are most conducive. Fourth, there is the choice of the 
rate of crawl. This involves determining the rules governing the adjustment of the target 
and band. Issues here concern the periodicity of adjustment, and the rule governing 
adjustment of the nominal exchange rate.
Regarding the target exchange rate, a sensible candidate is the notion of 
fundamental equilibrium exchange rates proposed by Williamson (1994). The basic 
notion is that participating countries select a set of exchange rates consistent with their 
targeted current account and GDP outcomes.7 
7 Operationally, for the single country case, this is done as follows. The first step is to empirically estimate 
a current account equation of the form CA = α0 + α1Y + α2e + αXX, where CA = current account, Y = GDP, 
e = exchange rate, and X = vector of exogenous variables. This estimated equation is then solved to yield 
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Finally, rules of intervention to protect the target exchange rate need to be agreed 
upon. Historically, the onus of defending the exchange rate has fallen on the country 
whose exchange rate is weakening. This requires the country to sell foreign exchange 
reserves to protect the exchange rate. Such a system is fundamentally flawed because 
countries have limited reserves, and the market knows it. This gives speculators an 
incentive to try and “break the bank” by shorting the weak currency, and they have a 
good shot at success given the scale of low cost leverage that financial markets can 
muster. Recognizing this, the onus of exchange rate intervention needs to be reversed so 
that the strong currency country (the central bank whose exchange rate is appreciating) is 
responsible for preventing appreciation, rather than the weak currency country being 
responsible for preventing depreciation. Since the strong currency bank has unlimited 
amounts of its own currency for sale, it can never be beaten by the market. Consequently, 
once this rule of intervention is credibly adopted, speculators will back off, making the 
target exchange rate viable. Such a procedure recognizes and addresses the fundamental 
asymmetry between defending weak and strong currencies.
VI Conclusion: beyond the mentality of policy passivity
Today’s global financial system is a haphazard sub-optimal creation. Whereas 
East Asian economies are strategically manipulating their exchange rates, U.S. 
policymakers have rejected intervention on the grounds that markets know best and 
should be left alone. This asymmetry has allowed East Asia to pursue neo-mercantilist 
policies that have contributed to today’s massive global financial imbalances. 
the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (e*) consistent with the target current account (CA*), target GDP 
(Y*), and given levels of exogenous variables, yielding e* = -α0/α2 - α1Y*/α2 + CA*/α2 - αXX/α2
In a multi-country exchange rate system, these equations must be estimated and solved 
simultaneously across countries to ensure a consistent set of exchange rates. Moreover, it is also necessary 
for countries to agree on a consistent set of national current account targets as not all countries can run 
surpluses.
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The U.S. policy mentality is at odds with reason and the evidence. There are 
many theoretical reasons for believing that foreign exchange markets are prone to herd 
behavior. There is also strong empirical evidence that exchange rates depart from their 
theoretically warranted equilibrium levels - be they defined as purchasing power parity or 
as the exchange rate consistent with sustainable current account deficits. And from a 
realpolitik standpoint, it is unwise for a country to let itself be out-gamed by others.
East Asian policymakers are right to believe that they can improve economic 
outcomes through exchange rate intervention. As Williamson (1999) observes, 
policymakers that use theory to think sensibly about the exchange rate and how to 
manage it can do a better job than a pure unregulated float. The problem is that East Asia 
has gone about this intervention in an uncooperative manner, and that threatens disastrous 
outcomes.
1
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